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I. INTRODUCTION 
A number of recent psychological experiments have shown that the judged probability 
distribution of a continuous variable, such as the closing price of a stock index, depends on 
the particular intervals into which the variable’s possible values are divided, a phenomenon 
called “partition-dependence.” In particular, judged probabilities seem to reflect reliance on a 
diffuse or “ignorance“ prior probability of 1/N for each of the N intervals into which the state 
space is partitioned, plus an adjustment up or down for specific likelihood of each event. This 
implies that “unpacking” an interval [I1, I2] into two separate sub-intervals [I1, I1+x) and 
[I1+x, I2] increases the total judged probability. 
Our study investigates partition-dependence in experimental and field “prediction 
markets” for three types of naturally-occurring event domains (financial, sports, and weather 
outcomes). In prediction markets, people typically trade a set of all-or-nothing contingent 
claims on actual events. A claim pays off if and only if its associated event occurs. The price 
of the contingent claim is thought to reflect the market’s collective probability judgment about 
the event’s likelihood (Manski 2006; Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2005b). 
Most economists are instinctively skeptical of psychology experiments that use simple 
abstract or hypothetical events, modest (or no) performance-based financial incentives, and 
little opportunity for learning. These concerns are addressed in our experiments where all 
choices involve prediction-market bets on actual events, with substantial payoffs linked to 
choices and outcomes, and trading takes place over time periods lasting from ten minutes to 
several weeks, which provide a substantial opportunity for learning. Taking advantage of the 
complementarities of lab and field methods, we report a lab experiment, a field experiment, 
and some analysis of naturally-occurring field data. 
These results may interest both psychologists and economists. For psychologists, the 
magnitude and persistence of these effects in prediction markets tell us something about their 
psychological nature: Are they transient slips of the mind that are quickly displaced by effort-
ful thought, and erased by competition? Or do the concrete boundaries of a presented partition 
persistently influence cognition? For economists, partition-dependence is a distinct type of 
framing effect—the way in which an event is described or “framed” influences its judged li-
kelihood. This phenomenon violates a bedrock principle of rationality that Arrow (1982) re-
ferred to as extensionality and Tversky & Kahneman (1986) called description invariance: 
“The chosen element depends on the opportunity set from which the choice is to be made, 
independently of how that set is described” (Arrow 1982, p. 6). In fact, there are already ex-
amples of large-scale effects in economic field data that are consistent with a partition-
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dependent 1/N bias (see Section I.A.), in personal and corporate resource allocation, and race-
track odds.  
Some background about both partition-dependence and prediction markets is useful to 
present before proceeding to the details of the data and what we found.  
 
I.A. Partition-dependence 
It is now well established in the psychology literature that limited attention and aware-
ness can lead to reliance on judgmental heuristics, which can deviate systematically from 
normative logical standards (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Gilovich, Griffin, and 
Kahneman 2002). 
An early example is “fault-tree bias” (which set the stage for later studies). A fault tree 
is a hierarchical display with branches showing possible mechanical explanations for an ob-
served system failure (such as an airplane crash or a car failing to start). Increasing levels of 
detail are shown further down the tree branches. Engineers often create fault trees and assign 
likelihoods to the branches representing possible causes of a system failure.  
Normatively, when statistically important branches are omitted from a fault tree, the 
subjective probability assigned to those fault branches should be reassigned to a residual “oth-
er causes” branch. However, experiments showed that the increase in “other causes” probabil-
ity when large fault tree branches are omitted is too small, even when the subjects are highly 
knowledgeable about likely faults. For instance, when experienced auto mechanics were 
asked to estimate the relative frequency of six categories of reasons why a car might fail to 
start (battery, starting system, fuel system, ignition system, engine, mischief, all other prob-
lems) the mean proportion assigned to “all other problems” was .060. However, in another 
treatment where three of these categories (starting system, ignition system, mischief) were 
pruned from the original tree the proportion assigned to “all other problems” was only .215 
rather than .441 implied by responses given to the unpruned tree (Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lich-
tenstein 1978). 
Four psychological mechanisms have been proposed for fault tree bias of this sort: (1) 
enhanced psychological “availability” of explicitly mentioned categories1, resulting in higher 
judged probability; (2) ambiguity or vagueness about omitted branches2; (3) an ecologically 
valid belief that the presented fault tree conveys information about likelihood, because omit-
1 Tversky and Kahneman (1973), Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978), Van der Pligt, Eiser, and 
Speark (1987), Dubé-Rioux and Russo (1988), Russo and Kolzow (1994), and Ofir (2000). 
2 Hirt and Castellan (1988). 
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ted branches are likely to be rare;3 and (4) a bias toward an ignorance prior of 1/N on each of 
the N identified events4. Which mechanism is driving the bias is important because different 
mechanisms imply different limiting conditions, moderators and “de-biasing” techniques.  
Fox and Clemen (2005) distinguish among these explanations by asking participants to 
judge the likelihood of chance nodes of decision trees that had been partitioned in one of two 
different ways. In one study expert members of the Decision Analysis Society (an internation-
al association of professional decision analysts and leading scholars of decision analysis) were 
asked to assess the probabilities that the total number of members of their society would fall 
into different ranges five years in the future. (The current number was 764.) 58 of 169 con-
tacted members participated (34%) and were randomly assigned to either a low group or a 
high group. The low group was asked to assign likelihoods of membership falling in each of 
the intervals [0, 400], [401, 600], [601, 800], [801, 1000], [1001+]. The high group was asked 
the likelihoods for the membership intervals [0, 1000], [1001, 1200], [1201, 1400], [1401, 
1600], [1601+]. The judged probability that future membership will reside in the upper inter-
val (>1000) was 10% in the low group, for whom that interval is represented by a single 
event. The comparable judgment was 35% in the high group, for whom the (>1000) interval is 
partitioned into four separate events. 
This example is notable because the subjects are highly expert and responded self-
selectively. The first three psychological mechanisms described above cannot explain the dif-
ference in judgments between the low and high partition groups. The categories cover all 
possible ranges of events (i.e., there is no “other” partition), categories are not ambiguous, and 
participants were told about both possible partitions so that no information was conveyed by a 
single partition structure. Only the remaining explanation, a natural bias toward an ignorance 
prior across the categories, can explain the effect. A pure ignorance prior over presented cate-
gories would yield 1/N judgments of 20% and 80% in the low and high groups, respectively. 
The actual results of 10% and 35% are partway between those 1/N judgments and a common 
subjective probability for the interval (>1000) that is partition-independent. 
Other experiments have shown substantial robustness of partition-dependence to many 
variables. Partition-dependence was exhibited in controlled learning environment (See, Fox, 
and Rottenstreich 2006), using “linguistic priming”5, in solving probability puzzles, such as a 
3 Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978), Dubé-Rioux and Russo (1988); see also Sher and McKenzie 
(2006). 
4 Fox and Clemen (2005). 
5 Linguistic priming means that different descriptions of the same event can influence the relative salience 
of alternative partitions of the state space. For example, when subjects are asked the likelihood that “tomorrow 
General Motors’ (GM’s) stock price will rise by more than any other stock on the DJIA” their judgments are 
- 4 - 
 
 
version of the Monty Hall three-door problem (Fox and Levav 2004), in valuation of insur-
ance policies (Johnson et al. 1993), and with incentive-compatible payoffs (Fox and Rotten-
streich 2003; Fox and Levav 2004; Fox and Clemen 2005).  
Partition-dependence has also been shown when resources, rather than probability, are 
allocated to categories. Benartzi and Thaler (2001) show bias toward 1/N in experimental 
401(k) investment decisions and in an empirical analysis of retirement savings plan data. 
Langer and Fox (2005) show partition-dependence more explicitly, in allocations among in-
vestments in simple gambles with incentive-compatible payoffs. Other experiments on risky 
choice are showing that splitting positive-outcome events into sub-events seems to increase 
preference for those choices (e.g., Humphrey [1996]). Bardolet, Fox, and Lovallo (2007) find 
in archival data that corporations allocate less capital to divisions when there are more divi-
sions under the same corporate parent, consistent with a 1/N bias (see also Scharfstein and 
Stein [2000]). They also find experimental evidence that experienced managers are statistical-
ly biased toward 1/N in their hypothetical capital allocations even though they are not aware 
of their bias. Many studies with many years of data in different countries show a favourite-
longshot bias in horse race betting odds: Unlikely winners (longshots) are generally overbet 
and favourites are underbet, which is consistent with a bias toward 1/N probability for every 
horse (e.g., Wolfers and Zitzewitz [2005a]).6 Fox, Ratner, and Lieb (2005) show 1/N bias in 
experiments allocating money to beneficiaries, consumption to time periods, and choices to 
menus of options that are grouped by different attributes.7 
Note that the basic phenomenon underlying partition-dependence is the tendency of 
concrete, salient categorization to influence attention, thought, and judgment. This effect of 
salience based on how possible outcomes are described is ubiquitous in human communica-
tion, because complicated ranges of outcomes are rarely categorized naturally. Instead, a dis-
crete categorical structure is typically chosen, or implicitly conveyed by a choice of words. 
higher than when the event is phrased “Tomorrow on the DJIA, the stock whose price will rise by the greatest 
amount will be General Motors (GM).” The first phrasing, by mentioning the target event at the outset, primes a 
partition into the target event and its complement (“GM stock will be the highest” or “GM stock will not be the 
highest”) and an ignorance prior of 1/2, whereas the second phrasing, by mentioning the equivalence class at the 
outset suggests a partition of the state space into 30 stocks and an ignorance prior of 1/30 (Fox and Rottenstreich 
[2003]; see also Fox and Levav [2004]). 
6 However, Plott and Roust (2005) find that in some lab settings with parimutuel betting on abstract events, 
the favourite-longshot bias is a disequilibrium phenomenon which disappears when some institutional changes 
are made.  
7 Note that in many cases, allocating resources equally could be optimal (e.g., consumption smoothing over 
time when utility of consumption is time-separable and concave). But the point of these studies is that the way in 
which categories are unpacked or combined influences allocations, which is not optimal. For instance, allocating 
consumption equally among months will produce (slightly) different results than allocating consumption equally 
among weeks. 
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For example, in February 2003, a month before the onset of the Iraq war, U.S. Defense 
Secretary Donald Rumseld said “It is unknowable how long that conflict [the war in Iraq] will 
last. It could last six days, six weeks. I doubt six months” (Page 2003). Rumsfeld’s wording 
invites consideration of a partition of possible war lengths into intervals of [0, 6 days], (6 
days, 6 weeks], (6 weeks, 6 months], and (6 months+). If Rumsfeld had worded his sentence 
differently (e.g., “six months, six years, or six decades”), it might have established a different 
partition, with a different public perception of likely outcomes, with different political ramifi-
cations. 
In most cases, partition-dependence is difficult to expunge because talking about con-
tinuous variables often leads to a division of possible outcomes into lumpy natural-language 
categories. So if partition-dependence is prominent when there are clear historical frequencies 
lurking behind the cognitive walls of the presented partition, as in the naturally-occurring 
event domains used in our experiments (financials, sports, and weather), then it might be even 
more prominent when “unknowable” distributions such as the length of a war are divided into 
discrete numerical intervals. Tversky and Koehler note that (1994, p. 565), “the need to con-
sider unavailable possibilities”…”is perhaps the fundamental problem of probability assess-
ment”. They suggest that immunity of judgments to a particular partition is “normatively un-
assailable but practically unachievable”, because people “cannot be expected to think of all 
relevant conjunctive unpackings or to generate all relevant future scenarios”.  
Economic theorists have recognized the importance of cognitive availability that un-
derlies partition-dependence and begun to model it formally. Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini 
(1998, p. 524) note that “an unforeseen contingency is not necessarily one the agent could not 
conceive of, just one he doesn’t think of at the time he makes his choice.” Interest in “unfore-
seen contingencies” is generated by potential applications like simplified employment con-
tracts and the desire for flexibility when it may be difficult to imagine future events or judge 
their likelihood (Kreps 1979). Ahn and Ergin (2007) show that partition-dependence revealed 
by choices can be modeled by allowing subjective probability to be non-additive in a particu-
lar way.8  
 
I.B. Prediction Markets 
The assets (or shares) used in our experimental studies are usually referred to as “win-
ner-take-all” contracts (or “all-or-nothing” contracts, or contingent claims) in prediction mar-
8 Their paper contains a particularly thoughtful review of the psychological literature motivating their axi-
omatization.  
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kets studies (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004). Under reasonable assumptions, the prices from 
these assets can be directly interpreted as market generated probability estimates of the occur-
rence of these events (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2005b). The first large-scale prediction markets 
were created in 1988 at the University of Iowa (Forsythe et al. 1992; Berg and Rietz 2005), to 
trade assets linked to political events.9 Over the years, prices in the Iowa markets have been 
shown to forecast political outcomes more accurately than many polls about 75% of the time, 
in hundreds of elections. Around 2001, websites emerged where people can trade contingent 
claims on a wider range of event domains including political, financial and entertainment 
events, such as “American Idol” outcomes and when Osama Bin-Laden will be captured (In-
trade: http://www.intrade.com, cf. Wolfers and Zitzewitz [2004]). Firms have also created 
internal markets to predict outcomes of corporate interest, such as new product sales (Chen 
and Plott 2002; Ho and Chen 2007). 
Partition-dependence creates a challenge for prediction market design. In these mar-
kets, continuous variables such as political vote shares, movie box office grosses, new product 
sales, timing of event occurrences, and values of macroeconomic variables, must be necessari-
ly partitioned into numerical intervals by the market designers. Unlike categorical markets 
such as the winner of the Academy Award for Best Picture or the winner of the Super Bowl, 
there is typically no natural partition. If the way in which partitions are constructed matters 
for actual prediction-market prices, this will affect the quality of the resulting market-wide 
estimates (as shown in Section IV). Designers should treat partition-dependence as a cognitive 
constraint that must be understood and anticipated in a design, much as website screen dis-
plays and menu features are chosen to satisfy design goals based on an understanding of visu-
al and motor activity.  
A well-designed prediction market will eliminate ambiguity in the definition of events, 
and can control for the information conveyed by the partition choice if traders know how par-
titions are created. However, the natural bias toward 1/N in the assessment of interval proba-
bility cannot necessarily be designed away. Indeed, in naturally-occurring prediction markets, 
only a single partition for an event is always used. So without experiments like ours that com-
pare market prices for different partitions of the same state space, there is no way to know for 
sure whether there is a bias toward 1/N.  
 
I.C. Plan of the Paper and Preview of Results 
9 The Iowa markets were inspired by lab evidence that simple abstract experimental markets can aggregate 
diverse information well; see Plott and Sunder (1982), and Sunder (1995). 
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The next three sections report analyses of three types of data. In Section II we describe 
short-run experimental markets (two 10-minute trading periods) for three naturally-occurring 
event domains in which we can compare judgments and prices for different partitions of the 
same numerical interval. These data largely replicate the persistence and magnitude of parti-
tion-dependence reported in many psychology experiments (like the canonical Fox-Clemen 
study mentioned in Section I.B.). Section III describes a longer-run experiment conducted on 
the web, lasting several weeks. Subjects traded assets linked to team victories in the NBA 
playoffs and to FIFA World Cup soccer goal scoring. There is noticeable partition-
dependence but its magnitude is smaller than in the first lab study. Section IV describes data 
from naturally-occurring markets for numerical values of important statistics that macroeco-
nomists follow, called an “economic derivatives market”, created by Goldman Sachs and 
Deutsche Bank. A structural model of these data, which assumes that observed prices mix a 
1/N ignorance prior belief with other information, enables us to back out a de-biased distribu-
tion that predicts more accurately than the observed prices and suggests some degree of parti-
tion-dependence.  
All three analyses have strengths and weaknesses that are partly compensated for by 
the other studies (i.e., they are scientific complements). The lab experiments are the easiest to 
run and replicate, and they provide an initial estimate of whether partition-dependence exists 
and persists in the short-run. However, lab experiments do not tell us whether the effects 
would persist in the longer run. The field experiments on the NBA playoffs and soccer World 
Cup involve a longer span of trading and self-selection of traders who know a lot about the 
event domains and follow them closely (if not fanatically). The field data on economic deriva-
tives do not compare different partitions for the same variable, as we can do in the lab, but 
they involve higher implicit stakes and attract more sophisticated (and highly-paid) partici-
pants than we can ordinarily use in the lab.  
All three studies show evidence of partition-dependence. They provide an example in 
which a simple observation first discovered in straightforward psychology experiments is ro-
bust to market learning opportunities, increases in the span of trading, and the sophistication 
of traders. These results do not imply that partition-dependence can never be eliminated under 
any conditions. The results simply establish that some conditions that might eliminate parti-
tion-dependence do not appear to do so, although in some cases (e.g., the first lab study) evi-
dence of partition-dependence seems to decrease over time. 
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Instructions (translated from German) and many technical details are gathered in a set 
of Appendices [not intended for publication], along with some analyses that were omitted for 
brevity. 
 
II. STUDY 1: A LABORATORY EXPERIMENT 
Our first study is designed to see whether partition-dependence occurs and persists in 
short-run experimental markets. We also compare effects expressed in probability judgments 
(both before and after trading) with effects revealed by prediction-market trading prices. 
 
II.A. Experimental Design 
Twelve two-hour experimental trading sessions were conducted in April 2007 with 16 
traders in each session, divided into two self-contained groups (markets) with 8 traders in 
each. Subjects were N=192 undergraduate finance students (134 male, 58 female) from the 
University of Muenster (in Germany).10 The sessions spanned one week and took place in a 
computerized lab environment where participants were separated from each other by dividers 
during the trading periods. The instructions (see Appendix II) were read out aloud to ensure 
that all information about the experiment was common knowledge.  
The essential part of the experiment consisted of several trading rounds in a set of 
three simple assets that are betting contracts on the occurrence of specific future events. Three 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive events were defined for each market (e.g., the future clos-
ing of the German DAX stock market index). If an event occurred (did not occur), the asset 
that corresponded to that event would pay the owner 100 cents (0 cents) after the uncertainty 
about the outcome was resolved. Thus, exactly one of the three assets would pay 100 cents 
while the other two assets would expire worthless. 
By construction, since the events are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, a complete 
set of assets is certain to pay 100 cents. To allow arbitrage when the sum of state space-
spanning prices is above or below 100 cents, and to create liquidity, subjects could trade a 
unit portfolio of all assets with the experimenter at any time for 100 cents.  
Our experimental setting included three trading event domains: finance, weather, and 
sports. Figure I shows the event partitions for the German DAX stock index on the day two 
weeks after the experiments. In partition 1 (the low partition), the events are that the DAX 
index value is in the intervals [0, 7327.99], [7328, 7496.99], or 7497 and above (denoted 
10 This experiment corrected a small flaw in an earlier pilot study. More details on the design and results of 
the pilot study are provided in Appendix I.  
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[7497+]). In partition 2 (the high partition) the events are based on the intervals [0, 7496.99], 
[7497, 7646.99] and [7647+]. The weather outcome refers to the maximum temperature in 
Muenster on May 31, approximately one month after the experiments. The sports outcome is 
the total number of goals scored by the teams of German “Bundesliga” (Federal League) on 
the final game day of the current soccer season, 3–4 weeks after the experiments.11 Subjects 
were grouped into high- and low-competence groups based on self-reported knowledge on 
soccer (though as we mention below, competence did not seem to affect prices or measured 
partition-dependence). 
The main treatment variable is the way in which the state space is partitioned into 
events. For each event domain, participants in different markets were randomly assigned to 
trade one of the two different partitions of the state space. In order to eliminate the possibility 
that partition dependence is driven by information conveyed by the presented partition, we 
described both partitions to all participants in the instructions. As Figure I that was not shown 
to the subjects illustrates, to create these partitions, each state space was initially divided into 
four disjoint and exhaustive intervals (I1 to I4). In each partition two of the adjacent intervals 
were combined to form a single asset. In partition 1 (the low partition) the upper two intervals 
were combined (forming an asset 3 with interval denoted I3 ∪ I4), and the lower two intervals 
were traded separately (I1 and I2). In partition 2 (the high partition) the lower two intervals 
were combined (forming an asset 1 with interval denoted I1 ∪ I2), and the upper two intervals 
were traded separately (I3 and I4). Both partitions therefore have three separate events. Note 
that by construction, asset 1 in partition 2 is a fusion of assets 1 and 2 in partition 1. Asset 3 in 
partition 1 is a fusion of assets 2 and 3 in partition 2.12  
 
[FIGURE I: CONSTRUCTION OF ASSETS FOR THE TWO DAX PARTITIONS] 
 
For the weather and sports event domains the interval boundaries were chosen rather 
arbitrarily based on historical outcomes, so there is no conclusive way to link probabilities 
expressed by individual judgments or inferred from market prices to objective probabilities. 
11 The weather partitions are: [-, 15.9], [16.0, 19.9], [20.0+] (low partition) and [-, 19.9], [20.0, 23.9], 
[24.0+] (high partition). The sports partitions are [0, 20], [21, 25], [26+] (low partition) and [0, 25], [26, 30], 
[31+] (high partition). 
12 Thus, to the extent that any information is conveyed by the partitions described in the instructions, it is 
that the experimenter thinks that the dividing point between intervals 2 and 3 is special (perhaps it divides the 
state space into regions of relatively equal expected likelihood). However, because there is no informational 
asymmetry between conditions, partition dependence cannot be rationalized on the basis of information con-
veyed to participants by the partitions presented. 
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However, for the finance DAX event domain, the four intervals were created from historical 
data: Given the previous DAX closing price, and the recent short-term historical volatility of 
the DAX, we calculated the expected probability density function (PDF) for the DAX close 
two weeks in the future. Then we defined the interval boundaries such that each of the four 
intervals represented a particular percentile of the expected PDF.13  
For each of the three event domains two completely identical and independent trading 
rounds were run successively, resulting in six trading rounds per participant and experimental 
group, as shown in Figure II. Each trading round lasted ten minutes (with short breaks be-
tween rounds). The order in which the participants traded assets from the three event domains 
varied for each experimental session and was perfectly counterbalanced (i.e., for each of the 
six possible event domain orders there were two experimental sessions) to avoid any order 
effects. In each of the six trading rounds the participants were initially endowed with a com-
bination of assets (i.e., unit portfolios spanning the set of assets) and cash, to the value of €20 
in total.14 Participants were compensated based on their final cash and asset holdings for an 
afterwards randomly chosen trading round, at the point when the relevant uncertainty about 
the future outcome was resolved and asset payoffs (either 100 or 0 cents) became clear. There 
was no credit line and no short selling, although traders could use their available cash to buy 
unit portfolios and then sell the underlying assets. No explicit transaction costs were imposed 
for trading. 
The trading institution was a multi-unit continuous double auction (CDA) with a hid-
den order book. Subjects only saw the best bid and ask quotes for each asset (see Appendix 
IV for a screenshot and further information on the trading software). Participants could submit 
bid and ask quotes for each asset simultaneously, so they could act as effective market mak-
ers. Trading took place only among the eight traders that were assigned to the same market;15 
in particular they could not trade across markets with different partitions. During instruction 
13 This was done to allow—in addition to our main treatment effect—us to pursue comparison of our expe-
rimental market prices to historical frequencies. We will not discuss this issue in this paper. Note, however, that 
since different experimental sessions were spread out over a week, the DAX intervals were adjusted for each 
experimental session (based on the recent DAX index close) to preserve the percentiles (see Appendix III). This 
day-by-day adjustment of interval boundaries also enhanced comparability and aggregation of the data from 
sessions on different dates. Traders were not told about the procedure for constructing and adjusting the inter-
vals, since doing so would instruct subjects about expected probabilities and constitute an additional treatment 
effect. 
14 In each market (of eight participants) groups of two traders were randomly endowed with one of the four 
different combinations: 16 unit portfolios + 400 cents, 12/800, 8/1200, 4/1600, all of them representing a value 
of €20. For each trader her initial endowment was the same over the six trading rounds. 
15 The only exception was trading the unit portfolio which was always executed immediately against the 
experimenter. 
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and a practice trading round, participants were told how to exploit arbitrage opportunities by 
trading unit portfolios with the experimenter for cash. 
Before the first trading round for each event domain, and after the second (and final) 
trading round, the participants were asked to provide their individual probability judgments 
for the occurrence of the three events they traded. These judgments were not incentivized.16 
Some earlier studies have compared individual judgments of probabilities (as often elicited or 
inferred from psychology experiments) with probabilities expressed by market trades (see 
Camerer [1987], Camerer, Loewenstein, and Weber [1989], and Ganguly, Kagel, and Moser 
[2000]). Like those studies, one question our method can address is whether partition-
dependence is expressed by individual judgments, and whether it is moderated by the bundle 
of institutional and learning properties of markets (see also Fehr and Tyran [2005]). 
 
[FIGURE II: EXAMPLE OF THE TIME COURSE OF AN EXPERIMENTAL SESSION] 
 
II.B. Results: Judged Probabilities 
We start by considering the judged probabilities in the different event domains (which 
are required, by instruction, to sum to 1.0 across the exhaustive set of events). The notation 
p(I1) refers to the judged probability of unpacked interval I1, and p(I1 ∪ I2) refers to the judged 
probability of the single packed interval which is the union of intervals I1 and I2 (as in parti-
tion 2 in Figure I). Hypothesis 1 states the partition-dependence prediction for intervals I1 and 
I2 (H0(a)) and intervals I3 and I4 (H0(b))17. 
 
Hypothesis 1: 
H0(a):  p(I1) + p(I2) > p(I1 ∪ I2)  and 
H0(b):  p(I3) + p(I4) > p(I3 ∪ I4) 
 
 
16 Participants were also asked in advance for their self-rated competence in making such probability judg-
ments in the domain of the specific stimulus (scale 1 [incompetent] to 7 [very competent]). At the end of the 
session they were further asked to provide some personal information including age, self-rated knowledge in the 
field of statistics and econometrics, or trading experience. As mentioned above, the sessions were constructed of 
equally-competent people (in general knowledge about soccer) to see if group-level competence would affect the 
degree of partition-dependence, but we could find no such effects.  
17 Hypothesis H0(b) is reported solely to correspond to later market prices presentation. Note that H0(b) is, 
in fact, redundant for judged probabilities, since the results (i.e., effect size) have to be the same for both hypo-
theses by construction. 
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Table I shows the average pre-trading individual probability judgments surveyed be-
fore the first trading round of the finance, weather and sports event domains (N=96 partici-
pants in each of the two partitions).  
 
[TABLE I: AVERAGE PRE-TRADING INDIVIDUAL PROBABILITY JUDGMENTS] 
 
The mean difference between summed probabilities of unpacked intervals and of the 
packed interval is .312, .278 and .261 for the finance, weather, and sports event domains. (All 
reported differences are statistically highly significant, based on a Kruskal-Wallis test 
(p<.0001)). 
Note that if people were applying an ignorance prior of 1/N of the judged probability 
to each of the three events they faced, the difference between the sum of the segregated-
interval judgments and the packed-interval judgments should be one third. Thus, these judg-
ments show a very strong effect of partition-dependence, as seen in earlier psychology expe-
riments (e.g., Fox and Clemen [2005] or See, Fox, and Rottenstreich [2006]).  
 
II.C. Results: Market Prices 
Of course, probability judgments elicited from individuals might reflect thoughtless 
errors, which are strongly or weakly diminished in two 10-minute trading periods. Markets 
are, after all, a kind of dollar-activity-weighted opinion poll that also provide substantial time 
for reflection and opportunities for learning from others. We now turn to probabilities inferred 
from market prices.  
We first present some general facts on trading volume and market efficiency. Table II 
shows that the average number of trades per market (except for unit portfolio trades) was 
42.83, an average of 14.28 trades for each of the three assets, and total shares traded were 
about 140 in each market. Trading was relatively continuous across the 10-minute trading 
period and similar across all three event domains.18 
 
[TABLE II: TRADING VOLUME STATISTICS IN STUDY 1] 
 
18 The percentage of trades in each one-minute interval averaged between 8.5 and 11.8% (the latter in the 
second minute). 
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Recall that buying or selling the unit portfolio could have been used to exploit arbi-
trage opportunities rapidly. A bid (ask) arbitrage opportunity existed if the bid (ask) quotes 
summed to more (less) than 100 cents. Actual arbitrage opportunities are typically very small 
in magnitude (less than 5 cents) and are exploited after a few seconds.19 
Figure III shows the development of asset prices over time for the sports stimulus, av-
eraging over all twelve (identical) markets. In both charts, the lower path shows the average 
price for the packed asset and the upper path shows the sum of prices for the corresponding 
unpacked assets. The gap between the paths shows the size and persistence of the partition-
dependence. Estimates of linear regression lines for the price paths give a crude measure of 
convergence. The slope of the time trend for the difference in prices is .0094 (top) and .0159 
(bottom).20 These estimates imply that there is some slow convergence that motivates our 
later experiments with much longer time periods. 
 
[FIGURE III: DEVELOPMENT OF PRICE DIFFERENCES OVER TIME FOR THE SPORTS ASSETS IN 
STUDY 1] 
 
For each market, define the “equilibrium market price” P*(Ij) to be the quantity-
weighted average of the last three trade prices (price at which trades were executed, not bids 
and asks) in the second trading round for the interval Ij asset. The hypotheses of partition-
dependence in prices are parallel to those above for judgments:  
 
Hypothesis 2: 
H0(a):  P*(I1) + P*(I2) > P*(I1 ∪ I2)  and 
H0(b):  P*(I3) + P*(I4) > P*(I3 ∪ I4) 
 
The experiment generates twelve equilibrium prices per asset for each partition. Table 
III shows the mean prices (divided by 100 cents to make them comparable to probabilities) for 
the three assets of each partition. For comparison we also report the average judgments after 
 
19 For ask arbitrage, out of 144 markets, 87 have no arbitrage opportunities at all. Emerging arbitrage op-
portunities are exploited 10.83 seconds (median) after the opportunity first appeared. For bid arbitrage, 20 of 144 
markets have no arbitrage opportunities. Emerging arbitrage opportunities are exploited 12.24 seconds (median) 
after the opportunity first appeared. Furthermore, the chance to earn an arbitrage profit of more than 5 cents (e.g. 
asset prices summing to less than 95 cents or more than 105 cents) is incredibly rare; so even when arbitrage 
opportunities exist they are small. More details on arbitrage opportunities are provided in Appendix V. 
20 Graphs and time-trend estimations for the finance and weather event domains can be found in Appendix 
VI. We present the sports data in the text because the degree of convergence for the sports event domain (aver-
age slope difference .0127) is between the respective values for finance (.0099) and weather (.0148). 
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the trading and the partition difference (PD) from pre-trading judgments. Medians are re-
ported in Appendix VII. 
 
[TABLE III: MEAN EQUILIBRIUM PRICES (2ND TRADING ROUND) AND INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENTS 
(POST-TRADING AND PRE-TRADING)] 
 
The difference between summed prices (rescaled) of unpacked assets and the packed 
asset, averaged across the two partitions, is .267, .149, and .229.21 (All reported differences 
are statistically highly significantly different from zero, using session-level differences, based 
on a Kruskal-Wallis test (p<.0001)). The corresponding differences from ex-ante probability 
judgments are .312, .278, and .261 and from post-trading judged probabilities are 257, .226, 
and .256. Market-price partition-dependence is slightly reduced compared to probability 
judgments for finance and sports event domains, and cut in half for weather events. However, 
conservative tests using session-level data only show a statistically significant reduction for 
the weather event domain.22 
Market experience also creates a slight reduction in partition-dependence between pre-
trading and post-trading judgments. For a more powerful within-subject test we analyze for 
each subject the difference between the ex post and the ex ante probability judgments for the 
packed intervals. Since the general direction of the bias suggests the judgments for the packed 
intervals are too low, we define a subject’s judgments to reflect a bias reduction due to trading 
experience if this difference is positive, i.e. if post-trading judgments for the packed intervals 
are higher than pre-trading judgments. Averaging the differences for the three event domains 
per subject, values are positive in 52.1% of the cases (100 out of 192 subjects), and negative 
in 34.4% of the cases (66 out of 192), a significant asymmetry.23 Trading does not influence 
the remaining 26 subjects in any direction. Overall, the two 10-minute trading periods appar-
ently have a modest de-biasing effect on individual judgments, though a substantial degree of 
partition dependence remains after 20 minutes.  
21 That is, we average the magnitude of partition-dependence in equilibrium market prices for the upper and 
the lower panel (e.g., (.289 + .245)/2 = .267 for finance). Note that the partition difference is not necessarily the 
same for the lower and higher intervals in market prices, in contrast to the judgments where this difference has to 
be the same for the lower and higher intervals due to the fact that, by instructions, they always summed to 1.0. 
22 Significance levels for Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests comparing the size of partition-
dependence for ex-ante judgments (i.e., p(I1) + p(I2) – p(I1 ∪ I2)) with the effect size for market prices (i.e., 
P*(I1) + P*(I2) – P*(I1 ∪ I2)) are .58 for H0(a) and .35 for H0(b) for finance, .53 and .10 for sports, and .02 and 
.02 for weather. 
23 A sign test shows that the effect is significant (p<.01).  
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Summary: The lab Study 1 was designed to see whether partition-dependence occurs 
and persists in short-run experimental markets, and to compare effects expressed in probabili-
ty judgments with effects revealed by market trading prices. Both judgments and prices do 
show strong effects of partition-dependence across the three event domains that we used. 
Market prices show a much smaller effect in one of three event domains, and there is a small 
influence of market experience on post-trading individual judgments.  
Note also that the size of the effects—a difference of around .2–.3 between the sum of 
unpacked event probabilities and the packed event probability—is quite close to the gap of .35 
in the example from Fox and Clemen (2005) presented in the introduction. The effect is even 
larger when stated in terms of percentage changes: the median probabilities of the packed 
events are around .35, so an increase of .2–.3 in probability by unpacking that event into two 
components inflates its perceived relative probability by more than one-half. 
 
III. STUDY 2: AN NBA/FIFA FIELD EXPERIMENT 
The modest effects of trading experience on partition-dependence seen in Study 1, af-
ter twenty minutes of trading, suggest the possibility that with much longer trading spans, and 
perhaps with more knowledgeable traders, partition-dependence could be reduced more 
strongly or wiped out. Study 2, a field experiment lasting several weeks, was designed to test 
this hypothesis. 
 
III.A. Experimental Design 
From April to July 2006 we conducted internet-based prediction markets for outcomes 
in the NBA basketball playoffs 2005/06 and the FIFA soccer World Cup 2006. Trading mar-
kets were open continuously for nine weeks for the NBA markets (April 20 through June 21, 
2006) and seven weeks for the FIFA markets (May 24 through July 9, 2006) (except for mar-
kets that closed when teams were eliminated). We recruited N=317 undergraduate finance 
students from the University of Muenster (in Germany) and N=139 students from the CAS-
SEL list at UCLA, Los Angeles (United States).24  
Contracts are all-or-nothing contingent claims on intervals of the total number of vic-
tories for a particular NBA team during the playoffs, and the total number of goals scored by 
a particular national team during the entire World Cup tournament (excluding shoot-out 
24 We used two different channels of recruitment as we planned to analyze second-order effects (We ex-
pected U.S. students to feel more competent about NBA events whereas German students should feel more com-
petent in the FIFA soccer World Cup events). Because U.S. participation in the World Cup markets was low, 
there is little statistical power to detect such effects so they will not be discussed further.  
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goals). As in Study 1, for each event domain, there are two partitions that combine sub-events 
differently, as shown in Figures IVa and IVb. For example, in the NBA markets the first parti-
tion packs the victory intervals [4, 7] and [8, 11] into a single interval [4, 11], and unpacks the 
interval [12, 16] into two components of [12, 15] and [16]. In the instructions, the participants 
were explicitly informed what the two different partition sets were (and that they were ran-
domly assigned to only one partition), to control for the concern that offering one partition 
would convey information to subjects about likelihoods.25 Every participant was allowed to 
trade assets based on four different teams—called “team markets”—using the same numerical 
partitions for each of the four teams.  
 
[FIGURE IVa: CONSTRUCTION OF ASSET PARTITIONS (PLAYOFFS VICTORY TOTALS)] 
 
[FIGURE IVb: CONSTRUCTION OF ASSET PARTITIONS (WORLD CUP GOAL TOTALS)] 
 
The NBA intervals correspond to the number of victories needed by a team to advance 
across the four playoffs rounds, so bets on the various win-total events are equivalent to bet-
ting that teams will lose in the first round, the second round, and so forth26. The intervals for 
the number of goals in the FIFA soccer World Cup were not structured to correspond to ad-
vancement across rounds, but were chosen such that they all appeared likely based on the re-
sults from the three previous World Cups. 
The experimental protocol was similar to Study 1, but was adapted for the Web (see 
Appendix VIII).27 Participants were instructed about the composition of assets and markets 
25 Note that subjects did not see the actual Figures IVa and IVb which show the clear links between packed 
and unpacked events, but they were informed of the two sets of partition intervals (Appendix VIII contains the 
complete instructions of Study 2. Information about the partitions can be found in subsection 3.1.of the instruc-
tions.). 
26 Each fixture is a best-of-seven match, so the first team to win four games wins the round and advances. 
Therefore, betting on the interval [0, 3] is equivalent to betting that the team has to leave the playoffs in the first 
round, because a team that only wins a total of 0–3 games will be eliminated by an opponent that wins four. The 
interval [12, 15] is equivalent to winning three rounds but losing in the fourth (and final) round. The interval [16] 
is only reached by the NBA champion, who wins four games in all four rounds. 
27 Participants were randomly assigned to one four-team market for NBA playoffs games, then to another 
four-team market for FIFA World Cup. Groups were reshuffled for the World Cup markets so that students only 
faced the same traders again by coincidence. Participants from the two different recruitment channels were never 
assigned to the same market, though. (This happened for reasons of a second order competence analysis that we 
will not discuss in this paper.) In addition, the students didn’t know anything about the identity of their counter-
parts in a market. Each experimental group initially had twenty traders, but some dropped out over time. NBA 
four-team markets included two teams from each of the two conferences (Eastern and Western). World Cup 
four-team markets used four official tournament “groups”, out of the eight groups created by FIFA organizers, 
which were supposed to generate the most interest and trade. (The groups we used were group A: Germany, 
Costa Rica, Poland, Ecuador; group C: Argentina, Côte d’Ivoire, Serbia/Montenegro, Netherlands; group E: 
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(including the partitions of assets they could trade, and the alternative partition), how to use 
the trading system, and some details about the NBA playoffs and the FIFA World Cup, by e-
mail. They also had Internet access to a homepage with study details, FAQs, and a practice 
market. The market was open continuously. As in Study 1, the trading mechanism was a mul-
ti-unit continuous double auction (CDA) with a hidden order book, so that subjects could see 
only the best bid and ask quotes and the most recent trade price for each asset. Traders could 
submit bid and ask quotes for each asset simultaneously, acting as market makers. Trading 
took place only among the twenty participants eligible to trade in each market. There was no 
credit line or short selling opportunity, except for purchases of the unit portfolio from the ex-
perimenter.  
Participants were initially endowed with different combinations of cash and unit port-
folios totaling €10 in each “team market” of the NBA playoffs and were endowed again in the 
World Cup markets.28 At the end of the experiment we randomly drew one out of the four 
teams for each experimental group to compensate the participants based on the sum of the 
actual asset values in their final portfolio and their cash balance, for an expected payment of 
€20 (€10 for playoffs and €10 for World Cup markets) per person. We also collected ques-
tionnaire data from all participants before and after trading, including individual judgments of 
the probabilities that outcomes would fall into the intervals corresponding to the assets they 
traded.  
It is important to stress that the participants only had direct access to their own four-
team NBA and World Cup markets. They could not directly observe market data (like prices 
or quotes) from other experimental groups trading different partitions.29  
For each part of the study—NBA playoffs and soccer World Cup—assets on 16 teams 
were traded. We can thus compare trading prices from two different partitions for each of 16 
teams in each of the two event domains. Due to the large number of participants that were 
recruited, we could fill two identical experimental settings (“clones”) with German students 
and one identical setting with U.S. students.  
 
Italy, Ghana, USA, Czech Republic; and group F: Brazil, Croatia, Australia, Japan.) These design choices should 
not have any obvious biases in creating or diminishing partition-dependence. 
28 In each market (of twenty participants) always four traders were randomly endowed with one of the five 
different combinations: 9 unit portfolios + 100 cents, 7/300, 5/500, 3/700, and 1/900, all of them representing a 
value of €10. For each trader the composition of her initial endowment was the same for the four “team markets” 
in the NBA playoffs part, but was randomized again for the FIFA World Cup markets. 
29 Of course, we cannot exclude the possibility that students were informed about these prices by friends 
that happen to trade exactly the same teams but the other partition of the state space. However, even in this case, 
arbitrage opportunities across markets could not jointly be exploited as it was not guaranteed that the same team 
was chosen for the incentive-compatible payment in both groups.  
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III.B. Results 
The analysis of results is similar to the analysis from lab Study 1 in Section II. First we 
test for partition-dependence in the individual probability judgments elicited before the begin-
ning of trade. Next we look for partition-dependence in the bids, asks, and trading prices in 
the markets. We also test whether the probabilities for the lowest-outcome event ([0, 3]), 
which is the same interval in both partitions, happen to differ in the differently-partitioned 
markets. There is no reason to expect that these probabilities will differ (because the ignor-
ance prior probability is 1/4 for this event in both partitions), but any difference provides a 
measure of sampling error. 
Because some participants did not submit probability judgments before the first 
playoffs game was played (and we exclude their judgments), there are N=302 (199 German 
and 103 U.S.) sets of judgments for the NBA teams. For the World Cup, there are N=263 
judgment sets submitted by German participants before the opening game was played.30  
Tables IVa and IVb show the median differences in judgments (×100) for the two dif-
ferent partitions and significance by a Kruskal-Wallis test. Not surprisingly, the differences in 
the commonly partitioned event [0, 3] between partitions (in the first column) are close to 
zero and not statistically significant.31 The differences between the summed probabilities of 
the unpacked events and the probability for the corresponding packed event are positive, al-
most always highly significant, and are comparable in magnitude to the effects reported earli-
er (approximately a .20 increase in probability when the interval is unpacked).  
 
[TABLE IVa: PARTITION-DEPENDENCE IN PRE-TRADING JUDGMENTS FOR NBA EVENTS] 
 
[TABLE IVb: PARTITION-DEPENDENCE IN PRE-TRADING JUDGMENTS FOR FIFA EVENTS] 
 
We now look at activity in the two most liquid experimental markets for each team (as 
measured by the overall number of trades).32 In the NBA playoffs, the most liquid markets 
were the Dallas Mavericks (DAL) and Miami Heat (MIA) (partly because they became the 
two finalists, so their assets were traded for the longest span of time). For DAL, there were 
30 We do not report any results for U.S. participants since there was an extensive dropout of U.S. students 
for this part of the study. 
31 This is just a test for whether there are systematically different beliefs in the two markets, and also gives 
a measure of statistical variability that is useful for judging the size of any partition-dependence effect. 
32 For this purpose, we choose from the market clones the most active team-markets in each partition for 
each team and match them for further analyses. 
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129 and 119 trades in partitions 1 and 2, respectively. For MIA, there were 101 trades and 102 
trades in partitions 1 and 2, respectively.  
 
[FIGURE Va: PRICE CHART (DALLAS MAVERICKS, DAL)] 
 
Figures Va and Vb show the most recent market price (in cents) plotted against the 
number of days since trading began, for assets corresponding to different partitions. Because 
there were only about two trades per day across all assets, there are many horizontal flat spots 
in the time series, which indicate the level of the last trade price when there is no current trad-
ing. Vertical lines indicate the beginning of a game. The (s1), (s2), etc. at the top of the charts 
indicate the number of cumulated wins after each game. For example, Figure Va shows that 
DAL won the first four games ((s1) – (s4)), lost the next game (status remains (s4)), won the 
sixth game ((s5)) and so on. The upper panels compare prices for the asset 0 interval I0 for 
partition 1 (blue line) and partition 2 (red line) (these prices are low, usually zero, since DAL 
and MIA were expected to win many games, and prices do not differ between the two parti-
tions for each team).  
In the second panel a blue line indicates the current market price of the packed asset 
[4, 11] of partition 1 and a red line shows the sum of the market prices for unpacked assets 
[4, 7] and [8, 11] of partition 2. The fact that the red line lies above the blue line reflects parti-
tion-dependence.  
The third panel shows a red line for the current market price of packed asset [12, 16] 
of partition 2 and the blue line represents the sum of the market prices for the unpacked assets 
[12, 15] and [16] of partition 1. The fact that the blue line is above the red line, for most of the 
time, indicates partition-dependence. 
 
[FIGURE Vb: PRICE CHART (MIAMI HEAT, MIA)] 
 
Figure Vb shows similar patterns for the MIA markets. Partition-dependence is evi-
dent for the first thirty days and diminishes afterwards. Note that for both markets, the sum of 
prices within a partition is often above 100, indicating potential arbitrage opportunities. How-
ever, because trading was thin and bid-ask spreads were typically wide, there were few ex-
ecutable arbitrage opportunities.  
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For the World Cup, Figures VIa and VIb show price charts for Germany (59 and 57 
trades in partitions 1 and 2) and Italy, the eventual World Cup champion (65 trades in both 
partitions).  
Both markets show persistent partition-dependence of recent prices, i.e., the red line is 
above blue in the middle panel and vice versa in the lower panel. 
 
[FIGURE VIa: PRICE CHART (GERMANY, GER)] 
 
[FIGURE VIb: PRICE CHART (ITALY, ITA)] 
 
Because prices are constantly changing in response to new information over the sever-
al weeks of these tournaments, the ”equilibrium market prices” for a static event toward the 
end of trading cannot easily be used to determine the degree of partition-dependence revealed 
by prices (as in the lab Study 1). Therefore partition-dependence is measured in two more 
nuanced ways. Both methods measure the hypothetical “pseudo-arbitrage” available by com-
paring the summed prices for the two unpacked-interval assets (traded in one market) with the 
price for the equivalent packed-interval asset (traded in a different market). Note that these 
calculations are not true arbitrage opportunities because traders cannot actually trade in the 
markets with different partitions; they simply provide an economically interesting measure of 
the partition-dependent gap in prices between the two markets. 
For brevity, one method is described in detail and the second is described in Appendix 
IX. The method described in Appendix IX calculates the time-weighted pseudo-arbitrage 
profits from selling the unpacked-interval assets and buying the equivalent packed-interval 
asset, at available bid and ask prices. Because trading is often quite thin, there are long 
stretches of time when bids and asks are not available on all assets and the measured partition-
dependence is zero. (We provide more summary details below.) 
We now describe our second method, the “interpolated-price hypothetical arbitrage”. 
The past and future prices are used to interpolate a trade price continuously. The arbitrage is 
hypothetical because it summarizes price differences in separate markets and assumes that 
trades can take place when there are no standing bids or asks. Because they cannot trade 
across markets, participants cannot directly act on these pseudo-arbitrage opportunities. This 
method is conservative because it assumes that hypothetical trades would only be executed at 
the worst of the observable prices. That is, even when there are no asks available, a trader 
seeking to buy is presumed to be able to always execute a trade, but only at the higher of the 
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last previous trade price and the next future price. (Similarly, selling trades are assumed to be 
executable at the lower of the last price and the next future price.) This method assumes, 
counterfactually, that there is a continuous flow of prices at which trades could occur (because 
there is latent willingness to trade that is not revealed by posted bid and asks). Note that bas-
ketball games and soccer matches are occurring during the continuous flow of trading, so us-
ing the worst of the last and next prices often means that traders are (hypothetically) betting 
against unfavorable public information, which adds to the conservatism of this measure.  
In formal notation, the interpolated-price hypothetical arbitrage profit for the intervals 
I1 and I2 (intervals I3 and I4) at time t is: 
 
(1.1) min[Pt-r(I1), Pt+n(I1)] + min[Pt-r(I2), Pt+n(I2)] – max[Pt-r(I1 ∪ I2), Pt+n(I1 ∪ I2)] 
(1.2)  min[Pt-r(I3), Pt+n(I3)] + min[Pt-r(I4), Pt+n(I4)] – max[Pt-r(I3 ∪ I4), Pt+n(I3 ∪ I4)] 
 
where Ps(Ij) is the trade price at time s for interval j, and t–r and t+n are the times of 
the most recent and next trades. 
 
To illustrate further, suppose the trade prices of a thinly-traded asset are 42 at day 20 
and 48 at day 25, and there are no trades between those dates. If you are buying the asset, we 
assume you could buy it at the higher price of 48 during days 20 to 25 even though there is no 
trading during those days (and even if there are no posted bids or asks). If you are selling the 
asset, we assume you could sell it for the lower price of 42 during days 20 to 25.  
 
[FIGURE VIIa: INTERPOLATED-PRICE HYPOTHETICAL ARBITRAGE (DALLAS MAVERICKS, 
DAL)] 
 
[FIGURE VIIb: INTERPOLATED-PRICE HYPOTHETICAL ARBITRAGE (ITALY, ITA)] 
 
Figure VIIa shows the interpolated-price hypothetical arbitrage profit over time for 
DAL in the NBA event domain. The blue line in the first panel shows the hypothetical arbi-
trage profits from selling at the minimum interpolated prices for unpacked intervals I1 and I2, 
and buying at the maximum interpolated price for interval I1 ∪ I2 (as in definition (1.1)). The 
red line, by contrast, shows the hypothetical profits from the reverse arbitrage strategy, i.e., 
selling at the minimum interpolated price for the packed interval I1 ∪ I2, and buying at the 
maximum interpolated prices for unpacked intervals I1 and I2. Because this “profit” can be 
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positive or negative, the second panel shows the value of this hypothetical profit when it is 
above zero (i.e., the profit conditional on it being positive). Panels three and four show the 
same calculations for the assets based on unpacked intervals I3 and I4 and the packed interval 
I3 ∪ I4 (as in definition (1.2)). The panel two and four hypothetical profits from selling the 
unpacked-interval assets and buying the packed-interval asset (blue lines) are often positive 
and large in magnitude.  
Figure VIIb shows the corresponding data from trades on ITA in the World Cup. The 
results are similar. Note that if there were reverse partition-dependence (the packed-interval 
asset price is higher) the red lines in Figures VIIa and VIIb would be above zero, but this is 
never the case. The fact that there is virtually no reverse effect proves partition-dependence in 
the expected direction (as indicated by the blue curves) to be systematically positive and not 
merely the result of random error. 
To measure the daily average interpolated-price hypothetical pseudo-arbitrage profit 
for each team, we calculated the area under the blue and red curves in the second and fourth 
panels of Figures VIIa and VIIb, and divided by the total trading time (in days).33 These sta-
tistics are provided for each team and interval in Table V.  
 
[TABLE V: PER-DAY PROFITABILITY OF INTERPOLATED-PRICE HYPOTHETICAL PSEUDO-
ARBITRAGE STRATEGIES] 
 
The average per-day hypothetical profit from exploiting partition-dependence, selling 
the unpacked-interval assets and buying the packed-interval asset, is higher than for the re-
verse strategy (buying unpacked and selling packed) for 21 out of 32 teams for intervals I1 
and I2, and for 27 out of 32 for intervals I3 and I4 (significant by sign test at p<0.1 and p<.001 
respectively). The median per-day pseudo-arbitrage profit exploiting partition-dependence, 
across the 32 teams from both sports, is 5.61 for intervals I1 and I2 and 6.41 for intervals I3 
and I4; the average of this median across intervals is 6.01. 
As noted above, we also computed the hypothetical arbitrage profit from executing 
trades only when bids and asks are available on all assets (see Appendix IX for full details). 
These strategies cannot be executed most of the time due to thin markets. As a result, the daily 
average hypothetical profits are low. The median and mean daily profit averaged across teams 
for exploiting partition-dependence are .03 and .35 for intervals I1 and I2, and .07 and 1.50 for 
33 Note that the relevant trading time ends either when the last auction for an asset of the relevant interval 
occurred or when the corresponding interval asset I1 (or I3) expired worthless.  
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intervals I3 and I4; the average across intervals is .92. Importantly, profits are higher from ex-
ploiting partition-dependence compared to reverse partition-dependence in 38 of 46 teams 
(z=5.88, p<.001 by a sign test, excluding 18 teams for which both profits are zero).  
The hypothetical profits from these two measures could be treated as a lower and up-
per bound on the financial magnitude of partition-dependence. Profitability as measured using 
simultaneously-available bids and asks provides a lower bound because there are so many 
stretches of time with incomplete bids and asks. Profitability as measured by the interpolated-
price method artificially liquefies the market by essentially assuming there is always a latent 
trade waiting to occur at the right price, so this method provides an upper bound (though it is 
still conservative because it assumes trades would be executed at the worst of the most recent 
and next future prices).  
Summary: Study 2 documents the persistence of partition-dependent pricing effects in 
a field experiment in which self-selected participants trade assets whose value depend on the 
outcomes of events in which they take great interest—the NBA playoffs and the World Cup 
tournament—and for which trading lasts for several weeks. These experiments address con-
cerns about the generalizability of lab experiments due to the limited involvement of traders 
and short span of trade. Probability judgments before trading begins exhibit partition-
dependence that is similar in magnitude to previous psychological studies—e.g., the sum of 
unpacked intervals (e.g., [4, 7] NBA wins plus [8, 11] wins) is judged to about 20 per cent 
larger in absolute probability than the packed interval [4, 11].  
The partition-dependence revealed by actual prices of event assets can be roughly 
bounded by two different methods. Using the possibility of hypothetical cross-market arbi-
trage at available bids and asks yields an average daily profit of about 1% (largely because 
there are long stretches of time where there is not a simultaneous set of bids for the unpacked 
assets and an ask for the packed asset). Using an interpolated-price procedure, which assumes 
that trades could take place continuously, but only at the worst price from the last trade and 
the next future trade, gives hypothetical arbitrage profits around 6%. The two measures 
represent likely lower and upper bounds on the practical profitability from exploiting parti-
tion-dependence, and therefore bound its likely economic magnitude in markets like these. 
For both measures and a large majority of team markets, these potential profits are much larg-
er than profits from executing the opposite strategy (buying unpacked intervals and selling the 
equivalent packed interval), indicating that partition-dependence is a systematic bias rather 
than an artifact of random error.  
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IV. STUDY 3: NATURALLY-OCCURRING PREDICTION MARKETS FOR ECONOMIC DERIVATIVES 
The lab and field experiments document the existence of partition-dependence when 
different partitions are traded (in separate markets) for the same event domain. An open ques-
tion is whether these effects can be inferred from naturally-occurring prediction markets that 
rely on a single partition. Study 3 addresses this question.  
In October 2002, Goldman Sachs and Deutsche Bank launched large-scale prediction 
markets for bets on the outcomes of macroeconomic indicators such as the growth in non-
farm payrolls, retail sales, levels of the Institute for Supply Management’s manufacturing 
diffusion index (a measure of business confidence), initial unemployment claims and the Eu-
ro-area harmonized CPI. These “economic derivatives” (ED) markets are designed to give 
professionals such as institutional traders (like hedge funds, large banks, etc.) the opportunity 
to take positions in unexpected fluctuations of macroeconomic risks, and potentially to pro-
vide better widespread distributional forecasts of the underlying variables.  
The basic contracts offered in these markets are similar to the assets in Studies 1 and 
2. For each underlying numerical variable (i.e., the release of a specific numerical macroeco-
nomic indicator) there exists a number of “digital (binary) options”. Each digital option spans 
an interval of the possible outcomes of the indicator. Buying a set of options can be used to 
form “all-or-nothing” contracts covering disjoint intervals of possible outcomes for the re-
leased statistic value. All contracts together cover the whole state space.  
The market prices can be used to derive a risk neutral density function of the market’s 
aggregated beliefs about the outcome of every single data release. Gürkaynak and Wolfers 
(2006), who report data covering the first 2½ years of these markets, conclude that market-
generated forecasts based on prices of these prediction markets are more accurate than the 
“survey forecast” released by Money Market Services (MMS) on the Friday before a data 
release, much as the Iowa political market prices are typically more accurate than comparable 
political polls (Berg and Rietz 2005).  
For each upcoming data release, 10–20 assets are offered in different ranges. The 
ranges are deliberately set to reflect the likely range of the outcomes. For example, the ranges 
for the non-farm payrolls auction increase range from 0 (i.e., unchanged from the previous 
level) to +300,000 in increments of 25,000 jobs.  
The market mechanism employed is a parimutuel system, which is common in horse 
race betting (in contrast to the CDA mechanism used in our studies 1 and 2) (see Appendix X 
for a screenshot of the interface). In this mechanism the prices of the instruments are based 
solely on relative demand for their implied outcomes and enables market clearing without 
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discrete matching of buy and sell orders. In parimutuel markets investors who bet on event A 
and win (i.e., event A occurs) share the winnings from those who bet on all other (“losing”) 
events. As in horse betting, the trading system periodically discloses interim prices showing 
what the payouts would be if no further orders were submitted.34 
These auctions typically take place in the morning before the economic statistic is re-
leased and are sometimes preceded by another auction on the same statistic release one or two 
days before (e.g., non-farm payrolls auctions are held on both the morning the data are re-
leased and one day before). Thus, these markets usually have a very short-term forecast hori-
zon and thereby offer hedging opportunities against so-called event risks. Figure VIII shows 
the implied probabilities from one set of digital options, for a retail trade statistic announced 
in April 2005. 
 
[FIGURE VIII: “DIGITAL OPTION” PRICES ON RANGES OF RETAIL TRADE STATISTICS 
(GÜRKAYNAK AND WOLFERS 2006)] 
 
First note that each ED market presents a single partition of possible event outcomes 
to participants (the digital option outcome ranges). As a result, we cannot compare prices in 
two differently-partitioned events on the same interval to estimate the degree of partition-
dependence, as was done through experimental manipulation in Studies 1 and 2. However, we 
can posit a simple econometric model to estimate the degree of partition-dependence: For 
each event category x, assume 
 
(2) fobs (x) = (1 – λ) · ftrue (x) + λ · f1/N (x) 
 
where fobs (x) is the observed implied probability distribution, ftrue (x) is the unobserved 
unbiased probability distribution, f1/N is a distribution assigning equal probability mass to each 
interval, and λ is the weight on the 1/N ignorance prior. 
If each event was traded repeatedly, the empirical distribution of realized outcomes 
could be compared to the distribution of implied probabilities and the 1/N distribution to pro-
duce a sharp estimate of the apparent weight on the 1/N component. However, there is only 
34 Since investors in the ED market are allowed to place limit orders, the parimutuel trading mechanism 
may result in multiple equilibriums. This problem is addressed by using a special auction-clearing tool that 
chooses the equilibrium prices such that the number of total trades will be maximized. (This clearing-algorithm 
was developed by Longitude Inc. and is called “Parimutuel Derivative Call Auction Technology”; see Baron and 
Lange [2003]). As in many traditional auctions, all trades (at a given strike) that occur are executed at the same 
price, regardless of the limit price. 
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one observation of implied probabilities for each point of time and each economic statistic. 
Therefore, we pool the data for the different points of time and across the different statistics.35 
We compute a mean forecast Mobs = µ( fobs) for each event by weighting the interval midpoints 
by the observed probabilities fobs and determine a respective ignorance prior mean M1/N by 
assigning equal weight to each interval midpoint.36  
From (2) it follows that Mobs is a linear function (1 – λ) · Mtrue + λ  · M1/N and if we call 
the actual realization of the economic statistic X and apply a little algebra we see that the ob-
served forecast error can be written as: 
 
(3) Mobs – X = [Mtrue – X] – λ / (1 – λ) · [Mobs – M1/N] 
 
That is, the observed forecast error has two components. The first component is the er-
ror term from a de-biased forecast based on ftrue (x) (which is expected to have expectation 
zero). The second component is a negatively-weighted term which reflects the degree of parti-
tion-dependence (through the weight λ). Intuitively, suppose the forecast from market data 
Mobs is above the equal-weight forecast M1/N. If there is partition-dependence contaminating 
fobs (x), then fobs (x) is biased downward (toward M1/N) relative to the de-biased ideal forecast 
ftrue (x) (which is an unbiased predictor of X). This downward bias means the forecast error 
Mobs – X is likely to be negative. Thus, when [Mobs – M1/N] is positive Mobs – X is likely to be 
negative (and vice versa). The strength of the negative correlation can be used to estimate      
–λ / (1 – λ) and the implied λ. 
Table VI summarizes the results of estimating regression (3) for markets for four dif-
ferent statistics. There is modest support for a negative correlation between forecast errors and 
the forecast – 1/N gap, which is consistent with bias toward a 1/N prior. One of the event do-
mains (initial unemployment claims) shows no bias; the other three event domains show sub-
stantial bias. However, small sample sizes for individual event domains make the effects sta-
tistically marginal. The coefficient estimated from pooling all the event domains, –.77 is more 
significant and implies a value of the weight λ =.44 (because –.77 is an estimate of –λ / (1 –
 λ)). Three of the four event domains imply values of λ from .39 to .56. 
 
35 To make the four statistics comparable we follow Gürkaynak and Wolfers (2006) and normalize the data 
by the historical size of the forecast error.  
36 Regarding the midpoints of the tail intervals, we also follow Gürkaynak and Wolfers (2006, p. 6, fn. 9): 
“For the tails we impute an upper- and lower-bound so that the midpoint would be equal to the mean of that bin 
if the PDF were normal.” 
- 27 - 
 
[TABLE VI: RESULTS OF REGRESSIONS OF FORECAST ERRORS ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 
OBSERVED FORECAST AND 1/N FORECAST] 
 
A second analysis computes the mean absolute error between the actual realization of 
the economic statistic, and the λ-weighted combination of the forecast from the observed 
probability, Mobs, and the forecast M1/N, for various weights λ. The values of λ that minimize 
the error from an λ-weighted combination are provided in the rightmost column of Table VI. 
For two of the statistics (unemployment claims and business confidence) the weights are low, 
but positive. For the other two statistics the weights are close to .50. For all statistics pooled, 
the error-minimizing λ weight is about .06. 
Taken together, these calculations suggest a small degree of partition-dependence in 
all four ED market prices (a total sample of 153 separate markets), and a substantial degree of 
partition-dependence for two of the four statistics. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Partition-dependence is the finding that judged probabilities—as expressed by individuals 
directly or implied by market prices for event-contingent claims in prediction markets—vary 
systematically with the set of exclusive and exhaustive events into which a state space hap-
pens to be “partitioned”. This phenomenon was first discovered in a cumulative series of psy-
chology experiments beginning in the late 1970s. The basic finding in those studies is that 
“unpacking” a single category or interval into two or more component intervals which are 
logically equivalent increases the original interval’s total expressed probability. The present 
paper tackles the question of to what extent market forces are able to eliminate (or at least 
mitigate) partition-dependence observed in individual judgments. Our experiments show that 
the bias transfers to competitive markets and that the phenomenon is robust to variations in 
the events that are being judged, the self-selection of participants, the length of the markets, 
and whether the markets are experimentally-created or are created by large market firms.  
Study 1 demonstrated pronounced partition-dependence under standard lab conditions 
for short-run (20 minute) markets. Furthermore, although market experience mitigates parti-
tion-dependence it does not eliminate the bias. Unpacking one event interval (of three) into 
two component intervals (out of three) increases its judged probability by about .25. Study 2 
documents similar partition-dependence in longer-run markets (several weeks) on events in 
which our participants took great interest (NBA playoffs and FIFA soccer World Cup). Un-
packing event intervals led to hypothetical arbitrage profits of 1–6%. Study 3 examined data 
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from prediction markets for macroeconomic statistics with a single partition in each market. 
Econometric techniques suggest that probabilities implied by prediction market prices are a 
convex combination of partition-independent probabilities and an “ignorance prior” (1/N for 
each of N intervals) with a weight λ for the prior distribution of around .50 in two of four 
markets and .05–.10 in the other two markets.  
We first note that if markets were opened with two different partitions, and traders 
were allowed to trade in both markets, there is little doubt that arbitrage would erase obvious 
differences. That is, if the price of events I1 and I2 were both higher than the identical packed 
event I1 ∪ I2, arbitrage would bring the sum of event I1 and I2 prices into line with the price of 
I1 ∪ I2.  
However, in practice there is usually no reason why two different partitions would be 
created and traded simultaneously. Therefore, the relevant question is whether revealed prices 
could conceivably be a combination of highly accurate prices for each interval and a 1/N price 
for each interval when a single partition is traded. The analysis of the 153 separate economic 
derivatives markets reported in Study 3 suggests the answer is “Yes”, that such partition-
dependence could influence prices. 
If one prefers a single explanation for many different findings, the combination of ex-
perimental methods used in the three studies suggests a basic behavioral propensity to bias 
judgments over N intervals toward 1/N is a component of what is observed. No other plausible 
explanation can explain the results of all three studies. The apparent bias cannot be due to 
information conveyed by the choice of partition because the subjects in Studies 1 and 2 were 
told about both partitions (any information conveyed should affect both markets equally). The 
apparent bias is not likely to be entirely due to the nature of trading institutions since Studies 
1 and 2 used double auctions and the Study 3 data come from a parimutuel auctions. The ap-
parent bias cannot be entirely due to naïveté of subjects, since there is self-selection of active 
traders in Study 2 (NBA and World Cup) and Study 3 (economic derivatives) markets.  
More generally, these studies suggest two important themes in thinking about the im-
plication of psychology for economics. One theme is that attention is grabbed by salient pres-
entations of intervals, and people do not spontaneously compensate for the effect of attention-
grabbing. In a similar vein, Morwitz, Johnson, and Schmittlein (1993) report that simply ask-
ing people whether they will buy a car in the next year increases their tendency to buy a car—
by 50%. Unpacking an interval into the two components increases attention to those compo-
nents and seems to increase implied probability. Because there is typically no canonical nor-
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mative way to partition a continuous variable, how the variable’s possible outcomes are di-
vided into intervals can inexorably influence perceptions of the likely value of that variable.  
The second theme is that the extent to which individual psychological processes influ-
ence market prices will depend on the processes and on the markets. As Camerer and Fehr 
(2006) note, in some market institutions the biases of a small number of traders will be ampli-
fied by strategic complementarity, and in other institutions biases are reduced because un-
biased traders can profit by extinguishing biases created by other traders. The partition-
dependence discussed here seems to exist to various extents in different experimental and 
field markets, but its robustness and persistence over time should be explored in further stu-
dies. 
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TABLE I 
AVERAGE PRE-TRADING INDIVIDUAL PROBABILITY JUDGMENTS 
finance weather sports
treatment pre-trading ind. judgm. mean mean mean
1 p(I1) 0.219 0.144 0.279
1 p(I2) 0.497 0.333 0.398
sum p(I1)+p(I2) 0.717 0.477 0.678
2 p(I1      I2) 0.405 0.199 0.417
PD difference 0.312 0.278 0.261
2 p(I3) 0.397 0.349 0.378
2 p(I4) 0.198 0.451 0.205
sum p(I3)+p(I4) 0.595 0.801 0.583
1 p(I3     I4) 0.283 0.523 0.322
PD difference 0.312 0.278 0.261
event domain
∪
∪
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TABLE II 
TRADING VOLUME STATISTICS IN STUDY 1 
 No. of trades per 
market 
(min – mean – max) 
Average no. shares per 
trade 
(min – mean – max) 
Total shares traded per 
market 
(min – mean – max) 
All 21 – 42.83 – 66 1.93 – 3.39 – 5.90 78 – 143.85 – 284 
Finance 21 – 43.08 – 62 1.93 – 3.37 – 5.42 81 – 144.17 – 284 
Weather 26 – 41.40 – 64 2.31 – 3.49 – 5.90 85 – 143.48 – 242 
Sports 25 – 44.00 – 66 2.07 – 3.31 – 4.37 78 – 143.92 – 210 
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TABLE III 
MEAN EQUILIBRIUM PRICES (2ND TRADING ROUND) AND INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENTS (POST-
TRADING AND PRE-TRADING) 
treatm.
mean 
prob./prices
equil. prices 
2nd round
post-trading 
judgment
equil. prices 
2nd round
post-trading 
judgment
equil. prices 
2nd round
post-trading 
judgment
1 p(I1) 0.152 0.205 0.048 0.116 0.230 0.252
1 p(I2) 0.561 0.494 0.256 0.307 0.490 0.432
sum p(I1)+p(I2) 0.713 0.699 0.303 0.422 0.720 0.684
2 p(I1      I2) 0.424 0.442 0.149 0.196 0.439 0.428
PD difference 0.289 0.257 0.154 0.226 0.281 0.256
(pre-trading) (0.312) (.278) 0.281 (0.261)
2 p(I3) 0.404 0.382 0.354 0.352 0.416 0.403
2 p(I4) 0.177 0.176 0.496 0.452 0.152 0.169
sum p(I3)+p(I4) 0.581 0.558 0.850 0.804 0.568 0.572
1 p(I3     I4) 0.336 0.301 0.707 0.578 0.391 0.316
PD difference 0.245 0.257 0.143 0.226 0.177 0.256
(pre-trading) (0.312) (.278) 0.177 (0.261)
∪
∪
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TABLE IVa 
PARTITION-DEPENDENCE IN PRE-TRADING JUDGMENTS FOR NBA EVENTS 
ΔMedian  Whole population (N=302x4),  German and U.S. subjects (pooled). 
Team event 0 equality 
p(I1) + p(I2)  
– p(I1 ∪ I2) 
p(I3) + p(I4)  
– p(I3 ∪ I4) N1/N2 
CHI 
CLE 
DAL 
DEN 
DET 
IND 
LAC 
LAL 
MEM 
MIA 
MIL 
NJN 
PHX 
SAC 
SAS 
WAS 
15.0 
2.0 
0.0 
-2.0 
2.5 
-10.0 
5.0 
-5.0 
15.0 
-10.0 
-5.0 
-10.0* 
0.0 
-12.5 
0.0 
-10.0 
19.0** 
20.0*** 
24.5*** 
17.5*** 
25.0*** 
25.0*** 
5.0 
22.5*** 
25.0*** 
20.0*** 
20.0*** 
30.0*** 
30.0*** 
25.0*** 
30.0*** 
10.0*** 
22.5*** 
15.0*** 
20.0*** 
18.0*** 
36.5*** 
12.0*** 
10.0*** 
10.0** 
23.0*** 
15.0*** 
10.0** 
20.0*** 
27.5*** 
2.0* 
40.0*** 
10.0 
36/37 
36/37 
37/40 
34/41 
34/41 
34/41 
49/51 
37/40 
36/37 
37/40 
49/51 
49/51 
36/37 
34/41 
49/51 
37/40 
Notes. The Table presents differences in medians for interval I0 and differences in medians for the sum of 
unpacked events and the packed event per NBA team. N1 (N2) indicates the number of subjects in partition 1 
(partition 2) that provided probability judgments for the team. Each subject (N=302) provided judgments for four 
different teams resulting in 1,208 judgments in total. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively (two-tailed) based on a Kruskal-Wallis test for each team. 
 
 
 
- 38 - 
 
TABLE IVb 
PARTITION-DEPENDENCE IN PRE-TRADING JUDGMENTS FOR FIFA EVENTS 
ΔMedian  Whole population (N=263x4),  German subjects. 
Team event 0 equality 
 p(I1) + p(I2)  
– p(I1 ∪ I2) 
 p(I3) + p(I4)  
– p(I3 ∪ I4) N1/N2 
ARG 
AUS 
BRA 
CIV 
CRC 
CRO 
CZE 
ECU 
GER 
GHA 
ITA 
JPN 
NED 
POL 
SCG 
USA 
-1.5 
-5.0 
0.0 
6.5 
0.0 
10.0** 
8.0* 
10.0 
0.0 
-2.5 
4.0 
5.0** 
0.0 
5.0 
10.0 
0.0 
37.5*** 
0.0 
22.0*** 
10.0* 
15.0* 
10.0** 
35.0*** 
10.0 
35.0*** 
12.5** 
25.0*** 
0.0 
32.5*** 
30.0*** 
0.5* 
15.0*** 
40.0*** 
5.0 
20.0*** 
8.5*** 
9.0*** 
20.0*** 
37.5*** 
9.0*** 
37.5*** 
5.0* 
27.5*** 
6.0*** 
30.0*** 
30.0*** 
14.0*** 
7.0*** 
34/30 
34/33 
34/33 
34/30 
32/35 
34/33 
30/35 
32/35 
32/35 
30/35 
30/35 
34/33 
34/30 
32/35 
34/30 
30/35 
Notes. See Table IVa notes. Each subject (N=263) provided judgments for four different teams resulting in 
1,052 judgments in total. 
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TABLE V 
PER-DAY PROFITABILITY OF INTERPOLATED-PRICE HYPOTHETICAL PSEUDO-ARBITRAGE STRAT-
EGIES 
 low intervals  high intervals  
Team Arbitrage PD 
(sell 1,2, buy 12) 
Arbitrage re-
verse PD (buy 
1,2, sell 12) 
Arbitrage PD 
(sell 3,4, buy 34) 
Arbitrage re-
verse PD (buy 
3,4, sell 34) 
 
NBA 
CHI 
CLE 
DAL 
DEN 
DET 
IND 
LAC 
LAL 
MEM 
MIA 
MIL 
NJN 
PHX 
SAC 
SAS 
WAS 
1.24 
3.71 
22.39 
3.49 
16.10 
7.98 
9.41 
8.56 
0.16 
27.51 
0.00 
5.87 
14.53 
0.38 
28.59 
8.27 
0.85 
0.72 
0.00 
5.48 
2.70 
0.19 
0.00 
0.00 
2.14 
0.00 
2.97 
1.69 
0.23 
0.90 
0.00 
0.00 
2.04 
13.48 
7.38 
2.43 
0.48 
0.00 
7.76 
8.29 
11.51 
13.52 
2.75 
24.03 
8.17 
0.15 
16.07 
5.23 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
1.54 
7.50 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.58 
0.33 
0.00 
 
FIFA 
ARG 
AUS 
BRA 
CIV 
CRC 
CRO 
CZE 
ECU 
GER 
GHA 
ITA 
JPN 
NED 
POL 
SCG 
USA 
0.53 
2.33 
0.00 
0.04 
1.01 
0.66 
21.85 
12.24 
11.87 
0.00 
22.84 
8.11 
10.73 
0.71 
0.60 
5.45 
2.55 
1.07 
5.63 
4.53 
6.30 
2.24 
0.00 
0.05 
0.04 
23.55 
0.06 
0.51 
0.00 
0.19 
0.20 
8.08 
13.05 
7.24 
0.57 
0.08 
0.01 
1.22 
29.21 
9.74 
9.35 
1.98 
27.66 
1.68 
6.54 
0.81 
0.25 
1.35 
0.00 
0.36 
3.50 
0.72 
0.24 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.20 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
2.14 
0.46 
0.00 
0.00 
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TABLE VI 
RESULTS OF REGRESSIONS OF FORECAST ERRORS ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OBSERVED 
FORECAST AND 1/N FORECAST 
  regression (3) results Implied weight λ on 1/N 
 no. 
events 
Coef 
λ
λ
−− 1
 
t-stat. p-value 
(one-
tailed) 
λ implied by 
regression 
Error-
minimization
All statistics pooled  153 –.77 –2.60 .01 .44 .06 
Initial unemployment 
claims 
64 +.13 0.16 .44 –.15 .04 
Business confidence 30 –.64 –1.88 .04 .39 .08 
Non-form payrolls 33 –1.29 –1.53 .07 .56 .57 
Retail sales  
(excluding autos) 
26 –1.01 –1.32 .10 .50 .50 
Note. P-value for test of regression coefficient different than zero is one-tailed. 
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Intervals: 1 2 3 4
Partition 1: Asset 1 Asset 2 Asset 3
Event space
(DAX)
7,328 7,497 7,647
Partition 2: Asset 1 Asset 2 Asset 3
FIGURE I 
Construction of Assets for the two DAX Partitions 
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time
Instruc-
tions
Finance
Run 1
(10 min)
Finance
Run 2
(identical)
(10 min)
Sports
Run 1
(10 min)
Sports
Run 2
(identical)
(10 min)
Weather
Run 1
(10 min)
Weather
Run 2
(identical)
(10 min)
Ques-
tionnaire
demogr. etc.
Individual probability judgments of the events
FIGURE II 
Example of the Time Course of an Experimental Session 
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FIGURE III 
Development of Price Differences over Time for the Sports Assets in Study 1 
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[0 - 3] [4 - 11] [12 - 15] [16]
[0 - 3] [4 - 7] [8 - 11] [12 - 16]
FIGURE IVa 
Construction of Asset Partitions (NBA Victory Totals) 
 
 
[0 - 2] [3 - 8] [9 - 11] [12+]
[0 - 2] [3 - 5] [6 - 8] [9+]
 
FIGURE IVb 
Construction of Asset Partitions (World Cup Goal Totals) 
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FIGURE Va 
Price Chart (Dallas Mavericks, DAL) 
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FIGURE Vb 
Price Chart (Miami Heat, MIA) 
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FIGURE VIa 
Price Chart (Germany, GER) 
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FIGURE VIb 
Price Chart (Italy, ITA) 
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FIGURE VIIa 
Interpolated-price Hypothetical Arbitrage (Dallas Mavericks, DAL) 
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FIGURE VIIb 
Interpolated-price Hypothetical Arbitrage (Italy, ITA) 
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FIGURE VIII 
“Digital Option” Prices on Ranges of Retail Trade Statistics (Gürkaynak and Wolfers 2006) 
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APPENDIX I: MAIN RESULTS FROM THE PILOT STUDY PRECEDING STUDY 1 
This Table directly compares to Table III in the main text. The pilot study was almost 
identical to Study 1 (and results were quite similar) but had to be rerun due to a small flaw in 
the description of the events. Packed and unpacked events differed with respect to the inclu-
sion of the boundary values. This is a design flaw because if subjects are highly confident that 
the numerical value is exactly at the boundary, then the interval prices for packed and un-
packed events could rationally be different. For the DAX stock market (scaled in the hun-
dreds) and for temperatures (rounded to the nearest 0.1°C) this boundary mismatch is proba-
bly a minor problem), but for the sports outcomes (number of goals) it creates an interpretive 
problem.  
 
treatm. prob./prices
pre-trading 
ind. judgm.
equil. prices 
2nd round
post-trading 
ind. judgm.
pre-trading 
ind. judgm.
equil. prices 
2nd round
post-trading 
ind. judgm.
pre-trading 
ind. judgm.
equil. prices 
2nd round
post-trading 
ind. judgm.
1 I1 0.244 0.245 0.247 0.199 0.159 0.180 0.287 0.270 0.268
1 I2 0.434 0.399 0.432 0.358 0.386 0.377 0.393 0.377 0.410
I 1+2 0.678 0.644 0.679 0.557 0.545 0.557 0.680 0.646 0.678
2 I12 0.428 0.407 0.437 0.300 0.316 0.302 0.426 0.439 0.434
mean 
PD difference 0.250 0.237 0.242 0.257 0.229 0.255 0.254 0.207 0.244
PD difference 0.250 0.230 0.24
2 I3 0.369 0.347 0.366 0.399 0.385 0.397 0.358 0.386 0.374
2 I4 0.202 0.226 0.197 0.302 0.310 0.301 0.217 0.202 0.192
I 3+4 0.572 0.574 0.563 0.701 0.694 0.698 0.575 0.588 0.566
1 I34 0.322 0.344 0.321 0.443 0.438 0.443 0.320 0.331 0.321
2 0.258 0.256 0.255 0.255 0.257 0.245
finance weather sports
event domain
 
treatm. prob./prices
pre-trading 
ind. judgm.
equil. prices 
2nd round
post-trading 
ind. judgm.
pre-trading 
ind. judgm.
equil. prices 
2nd round
post-trading 
ind. judgm.
pre-trading 
ind. judgm.
equil. prices 
2nd round
post-trading 
ind. judgm.
1 I1 0.200 0.272 0.210 0.200 0.118 0.200 0.285 0.296 0.245
1 I2 0.400 0.394 0.400 0.350 0.396 0.400 0.355 0.355 0.400
I 1+2 0.700 0.647 0.700 0.575 0.576 0.600 0.700 0.658 0.668
2 I12 0.400 0.396 0.400 0.300 0.336 0.300 0.400 0.393 0.400
median 
PD difference 0.300 0.251 0.300 0.275 0.240 0.300 0.300 0.265 0.268
2 I3 0.333 0.342 0.350 0.400 0.351 0.400 0.350 0.364 0.400
2 I4 0.200 0.209 0.200 0.300 0.307 0.300 0.200 0.222 0.150
I 3+4 0.600 0.591 0.600 0.700 0.687 0.700 0.600 0.616 0.600
1 I34 0.300 0.361 0.300 0.425 0.424 0.400 0.300 0.333 0.332
PD difference 0.300 0.230 0.300 0.275 0.263 0.300 0.300 0.283 0.268
event domain
finance weather sports
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APPENDIX II: INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE EXPERIMENT “STOCK MARKET IN THE LABORATORY” 
(TRANSLATED FROM GERMAN; ORIGINAL GERMAN INSTRUCTIONS AVAILABLE FROM THE AU-
THORS) 
See extra file. 
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APPENDIX III: BOUNDARIES FOR DAX-PARTITIONS USED IN STUDY 1 
These are all DAX boundaries used in the study 
 
slot exp. date partition 1 partition 2
asset1 asset2 asset3 asset1 asset2 asset3
1 5/2/2007 [0 - 7327.99] [7328 - 7496.99] [7497+] [0 - 7496.99] [7497 - 7646.99] [7647+]
2 4/24/2007 [0 - 7248.99] [7249 - 7415.99] [7416+] [0 - 7415.99] [7416 - 7563.99] [7564+]
3 4/25/2007 [0 - 7181.99] [7182 - 7347.99] [7348+] [0 - 7347.99] [7348 - 7494.99] [7495+]
4 4/26/2007 [0 - 7256.99] [7257 - 7423.99] [7424+] [0 - 7423.99] [7424 - 7572.99] [7573+]
5 4/26/2007 [0 - 7256.99] [7257 - 7423.99] [7424+] [0 - 7423.99] [7424 - 7572.99] [7573+]
6 4/27/2007 [0 - 7300.99] [7301 - 7468.99] [7469+] [0 - 7468.99] [7469 - 7618.99] [7619+]
7 5/2/2007 [0 - 7327.99] [7328 - 7496.99] [7497+] [0 - 7496.99] [7497 - 7646.99] [7647+]
8 4/25/2007 [0 - 7181.99] [7182 - 7347.99] [7348+] [0 - 7347.99] [7348 - 7494.99] [7495+]
9 4/25/2007 [0 - 7181.99] [7182 - 7347.99] [7348+] [0 - 7347.99] [7348 - 7494.99] [7495+]
10 4/26/2007 [0 - 7256.99] [7257 - 7423.99] [7424+] [0 - 7423.99] [7424 - 7572.99] [7573+]
11 4/27/2007 [0 - 7300.99] [7301 - 7468.99] [7469+] [0 - 7468.99] [7469 - 7618.99] [7619+]
12 4/27/2007 [0 - 7300.99] [7301 - 7468.99] [7469+] [0 - 7468.99] [7469 - 7618.99] [7619+]
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APPENDIX IV: SCREENSHOT AND FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE TRADING SOFTWARE 
The trading software was exclusively developed for the study. It is based on Java Run-
time Environment technology and was set up on a web-based client-server structure. The 
graphical user interface (GUI) was divided into three areas: information area, market area and 
order history (see screenshot below). Participants could submit, edit or cancel buy or sell or-
ders via an order form. Orders were processed and executed by the system within split 
seconds; the trading screen was updated real-time. 
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APPENDIX V: MORE DETAILS ON ARBITRAGE OPPORTUNITIES IN STUDY 1 
More details on arbitrage opportunities in Study 1: 
 
No. of trading rounds/markets with not a single arbitrage opportunity
Run 1 Run 2 Total Run 1 Run 2 Total
Finance 3 3 6 13 10 23
Weather 2 7 9 15 17 32
Sports 3 2 5 15 17 32
Total 8 12 43 44
time period [sec.] with arb.opport. per 10-min. trading round (N=144)
(min--median--mean--max)
Run 1 Run 2 Total Run 1 Run 2 Total
Finance 0--47.30--84.01--296.11 0--37.36--70.46--305.72 0--37.36--77.24--305.72 0--0--22.95--106.84 0--6.19--28.15--188.90 0--2.89--25.55--188.90
Weather 0--50.90--82.71--436.26 0--46.02--75.24--375.25 0--48.93--78.98--436.26 0--0--16.46--225.88 0--0--37.85--484.85 0--0--27.16--484.85
Sports 0--72.87--85.25--210.18 0--59.68--75.20--230.82 0--62.63--80.22--230.82 0--0--20.75--268.31 0--0--31.47--395.86 0--0--26.11--395.86
Total 0--55.40--83.99--436.26 0--46.87--73.64--375.25
20 87
0--50.71--78.81--436.26 0--0--20.05--268.31 0--0--32.49--484.85 0--0--26.27--484.85
time period [sec.] until exploitation
(min--median--mean--max)
Run 1 Run 2 Total Run 1 Run 2 Total
Finance 1.16--15.46--26.88--141.87 1.07--8.43--21.14--208.87 1.07--12.13--23.92--208.87 1.85--10.05--20.40--101.43 1.24--9.68--21.80--185.09 1.24--9.86--21.15--185.09
Weather 1.23--9.95--28-77--369.73 1.00--12.59--24.74--188.38 1.00--11.45--26.70--369.73 1.05--6.69--21.95--180.26 1.08--20.77--47.81--455.34 1.05--9.58--35.23--455.34
Sports 1.22--16.18--29.65--133.64 1.05--12.42--19.00--126.36 1.05--12.75--23.48--133.64 1.85--10.08--33.20--151.67 1.40--15.61--29.05--334.24 1.40--13.08--30.57--334.24
Total 1.16--12.84--28.39--369.73 1.00--11.45--21.38--208.87 1.00--12.24--24.62--369.73 1.05--9.52--24.06--180.26 1.08--12.42--30.78--455.34 1.05--10.83--27.82--455.34
time-weighted amount per arbitrage occurrence
(min--median--mean--max)
Run 1 Run 2 Total Run 1 Run 2 Total
Finance .49--5.60--11.85--119.00 .25--3.03--6.77--50.00 .25--5.00--9.22--119.00 .20--3.50--4.19--17.00 .38--2.00--3.24--13.77 .20--3.00--3.68--17.00
Weather .05--5.00--6.94--33.00 .62--3.00--3.77--15.40 .05--3.91--5.31--33.00 .01--1.55--2.57--7.94 .81--3.56--8.72--37.00 .01--3.20--5.73--37.00
Sports .62--8.38--10.54--44.99 .01--2.55--5.21--51.00 .01--4.44--7.45--51.00 .50--1.94--2.49--6.36 .50--2.65--4.42--15.63 .50--2.00--3.71--15.63
Total .05--5.60--9.84--119.00 .01--3.00--5.29--51.00 .01--4.10--7.39--119.00 .01--2.13--3.28--17 .38--3.00--5.01--37.00 .01--3.00--4.25--37.00
Bid arbitrage Ask arbitrage
Bid arbitrage (N=461 occurrences) Ask arbitrage (N=136 occurrences)
Bid arbitrage Ask arbitrage
Bid arbitrage Ask arbitrage
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APPENDIX VI: TIME SERIES OF MEAN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PRICES FOR PACKED AND UN-
PACKED INTERVALS FOR FINANCE AND WEATHER EVENTS IN STUDY 1 
 
 
 
 
- 59 - 
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APPENDIX VII: MEDIAN EQUILIBRIUM PRICES (2ND TRADING ROUND) AND INDIVIDUAL JUDG-
MENTS (PRE-TRADING AND POST-TRADING) 
Median values to be compared with the mean values in Table III. The comparison is 
useful for checking whether means are influenced by a modest number of subjects.  
 
treatm. prob./prices
pre-trading 
ind. judgm.
equil. prices 
2nd round
post-trading 
ind. judgm.
pre-trading 
ind. judgm.
equil. prices 
2nd round
post-trading 
ind. judgm.
pre-trading 
ind. judgm.
equil. prices 
2nd round
post-trading 
ind. judgm.
1 I1 0.200 0.129 0.200 0.120 0.051 0.100 0.250 0.244 0.250
1 I2 0.500 0.563 0.500 0.320 0.244 0.300 0.400 0.469 0.400
I 1+2 0.700 0.714 0.700 0.500 0.271 0.400 0.700 0.716 0.700
2 I12 0.400 0.453 0.400 0.200 0.130 0.200 0.400 0.422 0.400
2 I3 0.400 0.417 0.400 0.350 0.361 0.350 0.360 0.385 0.400
2 I4 0.200 0.177 0.160 0.400 0.474 0.400 0.200 0.149 0.150
I 3+4 0.600 0.570 0.600 0.800 0.842 0.800 0.600 0.553 0.600
1 I34 0.300 0.358 0.300 0.500 0.690 0.600 0.300 0.414 0.300
median 
PD difference 0.300 0.261 0.300 0.300 0.141 0.200 0.300 0.294 0.300
PD difference 0.300 0.212 0.300 0.300 0.152 0.200 0.300 0.139 0.300
finance weather sports
event domain
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APPENDIX VIII: NBA/FIFA STUDY 2 INSTRUCTIONS 
See extra file. 
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APPENDIX IX: HYPOTHETICAL ARBITRAGE BASED ON AVAILABLE BIDS AND ASKS (STUDY 2) 
The main text presents details of per-day profitability of a hypothetical arbitrage strat-
egy based on recent and future prices. This appendix describes the analogous results for a 
hypothetical arbitrage using current bids and asks. That is, we ask whether there would be 
arbitrage opportunities if traders could actually trade in both markets, given the available bids 
and asks which can be used for trade. Keep in mind that participants could only trade in one 
market at a time, so they could not actually execute these arbitrage trades (which is why we 
refer to them as “pseudo-arbitrage”). Asking how large the opportunities are is simply a way 
to characterize the economic size of the partition-dependence, using all the information on 
bids and asks.  
Consider intervals I1 and I2 which are traded separately (unpacked) in partition 2 and 
packed in partition 1. If there is partition-dependence, then the bids for assets I1 and I2 will be 
high (compared to bids for the packed asset I1 ∪ I2). So one kind of pseudo-arbitrage is to take 
the sum of the current bids for assets I1 and I2 (i.e., the prices at which one could sell those 
assets) and to subtract the current ask for the equivalent asset I1 ∪ I2 (i.e., the price at which 
one could buy that asset). If this difference is positive, then a trader with access to both mar-
kets could sell the two unpacked assets of intervals I1 and I2 for more than she could buy the 
packed interval asset I1 ∪ I2. If there is reverse partition-dependence, then the opposite strate-
gy would be profitable (buying the components and selling the packed asset). The size of 
these arbitrage strategies is represented in our notation as B(I1) + B(I2) – A(I1∪ I2) (i.e., selling 
unpacked and buying packed, arbitraging partition-dependence) and B(I1∪ I2) – [A(I1) + A(I2)] 
(selling packed and buying unpacked, arbitraging reverse partition-dependence) where B(Ik) is 
the best (highest) bid quote for interval Ik and A(Ik) is the best (lowest) ask quote for interval 
Ik. 
Figure A.9a below shows these statistics over the life of the experiment for NBA team 
DAL. Look at the top panel first. The top panel shows B(I1) + B(I2) – A(I1∪ I2) (in blue) and 
B(I1∪ I2) – [A(I1) + A(I2)] (in red). The second panel shows the maxima of each of these 
spreads and zero (i.e., it only shows their values when they are positive, when pseudo-
arbitrage is profitable). The blue spikes in the second panel indicate that there are pseudo-
arbitrage opportunities, which are sometimes quite large in magnitude but are sporadic and 
usually short-lived. The red line at zero indicates that there is never a set of available bids and 
asks consistent with profitable arbitrage against reverse partition-dependence. The horizontal 
lines at the bottom of the second panel indicate the spans of time during which any bid or ask 
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exists in the market for each of the assets in the arbitrage strategy. When those lines are inter-
rupted there is no liquidity and hence no opportunity for arbitrage.38  
The third and fourth panels show the same time series for the pseudo-arbitrage of in-
tervals I3 and I4. There are frequent interruptions in the bid-ask existence series (at the bottom 
of the fourth panel), so pseudo-arbitrage opportunities are rare.  
 
 
FIGURE A.9a 
Cross-Market Pseudo-Arbitrage (Dallas Mavericks, DAL). 
 
 
38 Missing ask quotes were set to +∞ and missing bid quotes were set to zero. The values of the positions 
are therefore calculated as  
min[B(I1) + B(I2), 100] – min[A(I1∪ I2), 100] and min[B(I1∪ I2), 100] – min[A(I1) + A(I2), 100], and 
min[B(I3) + B(I4), 100] – min[A(I3∪ I4), 100] and min[B(I3∪ I4), 100] – min[A(I3) + A(I4), 100]. 
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FIGURE A.9b 
Cross-Market Pseudo-Arbitrage (Italy, ITA). 
 
Figure A.9b shows the same time series for the World Cup winning team ITA. There 
are few pseudo-arbitrage opportunities for the low-goal intervals I1 and I2, but quite a bit of 
pseudo-arbitrage for intervals I3 and I4. From days 9 through 25, there is a persistent gap in 
the bids of unpacked events I3 and I4 and the ask for event I3∪ I4. These examples illustrate 
the advantage of using the continuous bid and ask information. Trades are rather rare for ITA 
events (only about one trade per day across all assets) but bids and asks are common enough 
to show persistent gaps in (potential) prices. 
Table A.1 reports the value of the time-weighted pseudo-arbitrage statistics for all 
teams. These are the area under the blue and red curves in the second and fourth panels of 
Figures A.9a and A.9b, divided by the total trading time.39 The profitability of strategies ex-
ploiting partition-dependence (in columns (2) and (4)) is often very low, but is above 1.0 for 9 
of 32 teams. Furthermore, pseudo-arbitrage against reverse partition-dependence is much less 
profitable. For 38 of the 46 team-partition comparisons, arbitraging against partition-
 
 
39 Note that the relevant trading time ends either when the last auction for assets I1, I2 or I1∪ I2 (I3, I4 or 
I3∪ I4) occurred or when the corresponding interval asset I1 (or I3) expired worthless.  
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dependence is more profitable than arbitraging against reverse partition-dependence (exclud-
ing 18 team-partition cases in which both figures are zero), a fraction significantly lopsided by 
a conservative sign test (z=5.88, p<.001).  
 
TABLE A.1 
PER-DAY PROFITABILITY OF BID/ASK HYPOTHETICAL PSEUDO-ARBITRAGE STRATEGIES 
 low intervals  high intervals  
Team Arbitrage PD 
(sell 1,2, buy 12) 
Arbitrage re-
verse PD (buy 
1,2, sell 12) 
Arbitrage PD 
(sell 3,4, buy 34) 
Arbitrage re-
verse (buy 3,4, 
sell 34) 
 
NBA 
CHI 
CLE 
DAL 
DEN 
DET 
IND 
LAC 
LAL 
MEM 
MIA 
MIL 
NJN 
PHX 
SAC 
SAS 
WAS 
0.00 
0.01 
1.95 
0.00 
1.36 
0.12 
0.16 
0.00 
0.00 
0.96 
0.00 
0.65 
0.25 
0.00 
0.44 
0.05 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
1.08 
0.26 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.06 
0.11 
0.03 
0.00 
0.00 
0.20 
0.71 
5.14 
2.61 
0.75 
0.00 
7.90 
1.46 
0.00 
0.24 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
5.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
 
FIFA 
ARG 
AUS 
BRA 
CIV 
CRC 
CRO 
CZE 
ECU 
GER 
GHA 
ITA 
JPN 
NED 
POL 
SCG 
USA 
0.05 
0.55 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.03 
0.64 
0.00 
0.22 
0.00 
0.35 
3.05 
0.29 
0.00 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
0.01 
0.11 
0.00 
0.06 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.02 
0.00 
0.00 
0.15 
0.48 
0.07 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
9.93 
0.00 
0.79 
0.00 
8.36 
0.00 
0.00 
0.23 
0.11 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
0.00 
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